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CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR RIVER POLLUTION IN INDIA: FROM GANGA TO YAMUNA

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THE REDWOOD JOURNAL Website: www.the redwood journal.com VOLUME:-1 ISSUE NO:- 1 , MAY 12, 2026 ISSN (ONLINE):- Email: thelawwaywithelawyers@gmail.com Authored By :- Dr. Riya Banerjee CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR RIVER POLLUTION IN INDIA: FROM GANGA TO YAMUNA Manuscript_RiyaBanerjee_RiverPollution (2) – Riya. Banerjee.docx Abstract River pollution in India, especially in the Ganga and Yamuna, continues to pose a serious environmental and public health challenge despite decades of regulation. The Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act 1974 and the Environment (Protection) Act 1986 criminalise unlawful discharge of pollutants and impose liability on industrial and municipal bodies. Judicial oversight through public interest litigation and the National Green Tribunal has strengthened environmental governance and directed corrective action. However, criminal enforcement remains weak due to procedural delays, evidentiary difficulties, fragmented corporate liability, and institutional limitations of Pollution Control Boards. This chapter analyses the doctrinal basis of criminal liability for river pollution, examines systemic gaps that allow offenders to avoid punishment, and considers comparative approaches to environmental crime. It contends that effective deterrence requires clearer offences, stronger accountability, specialised prosecution, and closer coordination between criminal, civil, and regulatory frameworks. Keywords: River pollution, Ganga, Yamuna, criminal liability, Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act 1974 Page No- 1 1. Introduction India’s major river systems occupy a central place in the country’s ecological stability, economic development, and constitutional imagination. The Ganga and the Yamuna are not merely watercourses; they sustain agriculture, provide drinking water to densely populated regions, support fisheries, and hold deep cultural and religious significance. Yet both rivers continue to experience high levels of contamination arising from industrial discharge, untreated municipal sewage, agricultural runoff, and solid waste dumping. Official assessments have repeatedly indicated that untreated sewage constitutes a dominant share of river pollution load in major urban stretches, particularly along the Yamuna in Delhi and downstream segments of the Ganga basin. Industrial effluents, especially from sectors such as tanneries, textiles, pulp and paper, chemicals, and sugar mills, contribute additional toxic burden. Despite decades of regulatory intervention and judicial supervision, measurable improvements remain uneven and fragile. India’s statutory response to water pollution began with the enactment of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act 1974. The statute established Central and State Pollution Control Boards and introduced a consent mechanism regulating discharge of effluents into water bodies. It criminalised violations, prescribing imprisonment and fines for non-compliance. The Environment (Protection) Act 1986 subsequently strengthened central regulatory authority and enabled the prescription of standards for discharge and environmental quality. The creation of the National Green Tribunal under the National Green Tribunal Act 2010 introduced a specialised forum for environmental adjudication and compensation. Constitutional jurisprudence has further expanded environmental protection. The Supreme Court has interpreted Article 21 of the Constitution of India to include the right to a wholesome environment. Through public interest litigation, the Court has issued directions relating to industrial relocation, effluent treatment, and river cleaning measures, particularly in cases concerning the Ganga and Yamuna. These developments demonstrate a robust normative commitment to environmental protection. However, the persistence of severe river pollution raises a deeper question: why has criminal liability not functioned as an effective deterrent? While statutory provisions provide for imprisonment and fines, actual convictions remain limited and enforcement often centres on compliance directives rather than penal consequences. Municipal bodies responsible for large-scale sewage discharge are rarely subjected to sustained criminal prosecution. Corporate actors frequently resolve violations through administrative directions or financial penalties rather than custodial sanctions. Page No- 2 This chapter proceeds on the premise that environmental governance cannot rely exclusively on regulatory compliance mechanisms. Where pollution endangers public health, ecological systems, and constitutional rights, criminal law carries expressive and deterrent value. It signals societal condemnation and affirms the seriousness of environmental harm. The gap between statutory promise and enforcement reality therefore demands doctrinal and institutional scrutiny. The discussion that follows analyses the structure of criminal liability under the Water Act and the Environment (Protection) Act, the doctrinal complexities of corporate and municipal accountability, procedural and evidentiary hurdles, and the role of judicial intervention. It concludes by evaluating reform pathways capable of transforming environmental criminal law from symbolic enforcement into meaningful accountability. 2. Statutory Framework of Criminal Liability India’s criminal law response to river pollution is primarily rooted in two central statutes: the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act 1974 and the Environment (Protection) Act 1986. Together, they establish regulatory standards, enforcement mechanisms, and penal consequences for non-compliance. A doctrinal understanding of criminal liability under these statutes is essential to evaluate why enforcement outcomes remain limited. 2.1 The Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act 1974 The Water Act was enacted to prevent and control water pollution and to maintain or restore the wholesomeness of water. It created the Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB) and State Pollution Control Boards (SPCBs), entrusting them with monitoring, standard-setting, and enforcement functions. A central regulatory mechanism under the Act is the requirement of prior consent. Sections 25 and 26 mandate that no person shall establish or operate any industry, operation, or process likely to discharge sewage or trade effluent into a stream, well, sewer, or on land without the previous consent of the State Board. Operation without consent, or violation of consent conditions, constitutes an offence. Section 24 prohibits knowingly causing or permitting any poisonous, noxious, or polluting matter to enter into any stream or well. This provision forms the substantive foundation for criminal prosecution relating to discharge into rivers such as the Ganga and Yamuna. The penal framework is set out in sections 41 to 45A. Contravention of section 24 or sections 25 and 26 is punishable with imprisonment and fine. For continuing offences, additional daily fines may be imposed. Enhanced punishment is prescribed for repeat violations. The statute therefore clearly contemplates custodial sentences and not merely monetary penalties. Page No- 3 However, prosecution under the Water Act is subject to procedural conditions. Section 49 restricts cognisance of offences to complaints made by the Board or an authorised officer, or by a

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JOURNALCRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR RIVER POLLUTION IN INDIA: FROM GANGA TO YAMUNA

FROM TERRITORY TO AUTHORITY: RETHINKING STATE RESPONSIBILITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS JURISDICTION

THE REDWOOD JOURNAL Website: www.the redwood journal.com VOLUME:-1 ISSUE NO:- 1 , MAY 10, 2026 ISSN (ONLINE):- Email: thelawwaywithelawyers@gmail.com Authored By :- SOWNDARIYA S FROM TERRITORY TO AUTHORITY: RETHINKING STATE RESPONSIBILITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS JURISDICTION ABSTRACT Borders have never fully contained power, and in today’s interconnected world, they do so even less. States increasingly exercise authority beyond their territorial limits through cross-border surveillance, extraterritorial military operations, and economic sanctions, yet international human rights law continues to struggle with holding them accountable. This paper interrogates whether a state’s human rights obligations end at its territorial borders. Drawing on the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee, the European Court of Human Rights, and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, it traces the evolution of jurisdiction from a strictly territorial concept to one based on “effective control” and “authority and control over individuals.” The paper examines three contested domains, military operations abroad, cyber and surveillance practices, and economic coercion, to assess the extent of this doctrinal expansion. It argues that a narrow, geography-based understanding of jurisdiction creates a protection gap, leaving individuals vulnerable where state action and control is most impactful. In response, the paper proposes a functional model of jurisdiction that anchors human rights responsibility in the exercise of power rather than territorial presence, thereby aligning legal accountability with contemporary realities of state action. Keywords: Extraterritorial Jurisdiction; Human Rights Law; State Responsibility; Effective Control; ICCPR; Functional Jurisdiction Page No:- 1 INTRODUCTION When a state deploys surveillance technology to monitor a journalist in a foreign country, conducts a targeted killing in territory where it has no formal presence, or imposes economic sanctions that foreseeably deny a civilian population access to medicine — who bears legal responsibility? The instinctive answer points to the territorial state. But the state that causes harm is increasingly not the state on whose soil that harm is felt. This disjunction between the location of power and the location of consequence sits at the heart of one of the most contested problems in contemporary international human rights law. International human rights treaties were drafted with a predominantly territorial logic. Article 2(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) obliges each state party to respect and ensure rights “to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction.” The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) extends obligations to everyone “within their jurisdiction.” These formulations assumed a world in which a state’s effective sphere of action coincided, more or less, with its geographic borders. That assumption no longer holds. States today project power through digital surveillance, unmanned aerial vehicles, financial coercion, and proxy operations that traverse borders with increasing ease and decreasing visibility. This paper adopts a doctrinal and analytical methodology based on treaty interpretation, judicial decisions, and scholarly commentary in international human rights law. This paper argues that a geography-bound interpretation of jurisdiction is no longer adequate to the task of human rights protection. Part II surveys the legal framework governing extraterritorial jurisdiction. Part III analyses the jurisprudential arc across three major international bodies. Part IV examines three hard cases where current doctrine is most severely tested. Part V proposes a functional model of jurisdiction. Part VI concludes. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK: JURISDICTION AS THRESHOLD Textual Foundations The concept of jurisdiction in international human rights law functions as a threshold question: before any substantive human rights obligation can be engaged, a state must be found to exercise jurisdiction over the individual asserting a rights violation. This gatekeeper role carries significant consequences. A state that falls outside the jurisdictional threshold faces no obligation, regardless of the gravity of the harm it has caused. The foundational provision is Article 2(1) of the ICCPR, which binds state parties to respect and ensure rights “to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction.” The drafting history suggests that “jurisdiction” was not intended as a synonym for “territory” — the disjunctive structure implies that territorial presence is one basis for jurisdiction, not the only one. The ECHR, in Article 1, omits any territorial qualifier altogether. The American Convention on Human Rights (Article 1(1)) and the African Charter (Article 1) similarly use jurisdictional rather than purely territorial language. The text, properly read, does not foreclose extraterritorial application. What has varied is the willingness of adjudicative bodies to fill that space. Two Models of Jurisdiction Scholarship and jurisprudence have identified two broad models. The spatial model holds that jurisdiction attaches when a state exercises effective control over a territory — typically through military occupation or comparable presence. The personal model holds that jurisdiction attaches when a state exercises effective control or authority over a specific individual, regardless of where that individual is located. These models are not mutually exclusive, and courts have often blended them. Understanding the tension between them is essential to evaluating the trajectory of the case law. III. THE JURISPRUDENTIAL ARC The European Court of Human Rights The ECtHR’s initial position, articulated in Banković v. Belgium, appeared to restrict jurisdiction to a regional “legal space” (espace juridique) constituted by Convention states. The case arose from the NATO bombing of the Radio Television Serbia building in Belgrade in 1999. The court declined jurisdiction, reasoning that nationals of a non-Convention state injured in a non-Convention territory were not within the respondent states’ jurisdiction. The decision attracted sharp criticism for its geographic rigidity and was substantially qualified in subsequent decisions. Page No:- 2 In Loizidou v. Turkey, the court held that Turkey’s military control over northern Cyprus brought that territory within Turkey’s Convention jurisdiction. In Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, the court moved decisively toward the personal model: the United Kingdom, exercising public powers in southern Iraq following the invasion, was found to exercise jurisdiction over Iraqi civilians killed by British forces. The court expressly acknowledged that jurisdiction could exist in the absence of territorial control, provided there was control over the individual. Al-Skeini represents a significant doctrinal shift — reconceiving jurisdiction as context-sensitive, tied to the actual